(p. 4). The Court decision redrew the Green Line and made a clear distinction between the territories of 1948 and those of 1967. By clearly declaring the 1967 territories to be occupied territories -something the Palestinians welcomed and the Israelis deplored -it declared at the same time the 1948 territories as non-occupied territories and established Israeli control over these territories as legitimate and legal -something the Israelis celebrated and the Palestinians deplored.
Against this rigidity in reading legal text, Strawson suggests an alternative approach: instead of treating them as being carved in stone and leading to one right answer, he argues that "Partitioning Palestine thus takes the texts themselves seriously but only as a point of departure for the discussion" (p. 5). He declares the main message of his book to be: "If Partitioning Palestine has one message it is that law and justice cannot operate without wisdom" (p. 7).
Clearly this is an important mission and a promising project. There have not been enough studies that try to apply the insights of CLS to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The openness, ambiguity, and indeterminacy that CLS requires stand in tension with the entrenched feeling of what appears to be a clearly just cause. The idea and feeling of justice requires a certain clarity, fixity, and closure that critical theory threatens with its radical questioning of taken-for-granted truths. Many subaltern, discriminated against, marginalized, and feminist groups have deployed critical tools to shake the taken-for-granted legal/social system that claims to be and portrays itself as natural. These challenges to the dominant "nature-like" picture have created fissures, rifts and cracks in the dominant story that allowed those groups to challenge it and tell a different counter-story, as opposed to the hegemonic one.
The fact of the matter is that those critical tools -CLS in law, deconstruction in literature and the humanities in general -do not challenge only the hegemonic narrative of the powerful/victimizer/dominant group, but potentially question any attempt to claim monopoly over truth, justice or a sense of victimhood. Thus, in principle, there might be a prima facie tension between maintaining a sense of justice that requires some closure and clarity, against the openness of the intellectual who never tires of subjecting everything to questioning and is not afraid to flirt with indeterminacy and ambiguity.
However, although the proposal of the book sounds promising and innovative, the reality falls far short. I will argue here that the book never follows its own methodology, and the openness, questioning, and second-guessing that the author espouses usually only applies to those ideas that he disagrees with, rather than to his own. Before delving into the details of how and why I think the book fails exactly where it promises to be most original, I will conduct a short survey of the book's chapters and main arguments.
Chapter One introduces the ideological background of Zionism and covers the diplomatic efforts of Zionism to win international recognition and support, culminating in the Balfour Declaration. What is interesting in this chapter (and it is a recurring theme throughout the book) is the close association the author makes between international law and the colonial powers. This is of special interest to Palestinians and other people in the developing world who may be enchanted with international
